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ABSTRACT
Identifying Search Engine Spam Using DNS. (December 2011)
Siddhartha Sankaran Mathiharan, B.Tech., National Institute of Technology Trichy
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dmitri Loguinov
Web crawlers encounter both finite and infinite elements during crawl. Pages
and hosts can be infinitely generated using automated scripts and DNS wildcard
entries. It is a challenge to rank such resources as an entire web of pages and hosts
could be created to manipulate the rank of a target resource. It is crucial to be able to
differentiate genuine content from spam in real-time to allocate crawl budgets. In this
study, ranking algorithms to rank hosts are designed which use the finite Pay Level
Domains(PLD) and IPv4 addresses. Heterogenous graphs derived from the webgraph
of IRLbot are used to achieve this. PLD Supporters (PSUPP) which is the number of
level-2 PLD supporters for each host on the host-host-PLD graph is the first algorithm
that is studied. This is further improved by True PLD Supporters(TSUPP) which
uses true egalitarian level-2 PLD supporters on the host-IP-PLD graph and DNS
blacklists. It was found that support from content farms and stolen links could be
eliminated by finding TSUPP.When TSUPP was applied on the host graph of IRLbot,
there was less than 1% spam in the top 100,000 hosts.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Search-engine spammers make use of Search Engine Optimization (SEO) techniques
that aim to manipulate ranking algorithms to give spam websites better placement.
Users are misled to the spam sites which generate revenues from click-through adver-
tisements. This makes it essential for search-engines to provide reliable results and
eliminate spam.
The motivation for our work comes from experiences with IRLbot [1]. When
we sampled pages from IRLbot, we found significant amount spam pages from spam
farms. Our work aims to identify such spam farms and avoid them while crawling.
Commercial search-engines like Google own large server clusters and huge bandwidth
to massively crawl the web. Crawlers from research labs and academia lack the
bandwidth and computing resources to crawl massively. Hence, it is crucial for such
crawlers to efficiently allocate the available resources to high quality websites. We can
avoid allocating huge crawl resources to spam sites if we could rank them lower. There
is also not much research that is publicly available on the design of web crawlers.
A. Problem formulation
It is challenging to rank infinite resources like hosts and pages as spammers could
create a web of hosts and pages to manipulate search-engine ranking algorithms. It
is hard to differentiate a spam page and quality website in real-time. There is also
limited crawl resources in academia and research projects. Hence, it is necessary to
rank hosts in real-time during crawl and allocate budgets.
The journal model is IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
2B. Contributions
We solve the problem of ranking infinite resources by using finite resources. We use
finite resources like Pay Level Domains(PLD) and IPv4 addresses in ranking hosts.
We use crawl data from IRLbot for all our experiments.
We first tried ranking hosts using existing algorithms like level-1 supporters(IN),
PageRank [2] and level-2 supporters(SUPP) [3] on the host graph. PageRank per-
formed poor and had lot of spam in the top 100 hosts. There were around 10% spam
sites in the top 100,000 hosts ranked by PageRank. We found this was because the
spam hosts on the top were supported by a huge number of spam hosts with a small
outdegree. IN similarly performed poor and had around 17% spam sites in the top
100,000 hosts. While SUPP also had around 9% spam sites in top 100,000, there was
only 1 spam site in the top 1000 sites. All of the above algorithms failed because an
infinite resource was ranked using an infinite resources. Spammers can manipulate
all these ranking algorithms when applied on the hostgraph.
We next ranked IPs using the IP graph which is derived by reducing the host
graph of IRLbot. We thought we could find higher quality hosts on higher ranked
IPs. We ranked IPs using IN and SUPP on the IP graph and found that there were
few spam IPs ranked higher. On further analysis we found that the IPs were parking
services owned by hosting providers like GoDaddy. Hosting IPs had high IN and
SUPP on the IP graph due to the IP diversity of the sites hosted on them. Hence,
we found that the IP graph was not very useful to identify quality hosts.
We also tried to find spam IPs by calculating the host densities of IP addresses.
It has been found that a high host density is indicative of spam [4]. We found that
85 of the top 100 IPs based on host densities were completely spam when sampled.
The non-spam IPs consisted of blogs and hosting providers.
3We propose a novel method of using heterogeneous graphs extracted from the
webgraph for ranking hosts. We propose that PLDs can be used to rank various
resources by generating the appropriate heterogeneous graph. We first propose PLD
supporters (PSUPP) which counts the number of level-2 PLD supporters on the host-
host-PLD graph. We found that this was efficient in ranking infinite resources like
hosts and had only around 3% spam in the top 100,000 hosts.
We improve PSUPP with a few modifications. We try to find the true PLD sup-
porters to hosts. We define true support as the support that comes from hosts ranked
lower than a host. We also remove support from outliers in the host graph when a
single host contributes a large share of the total support. We then merge inlinks in
the host graph from the same IP to a single randomly chosen link. This removes
support from spam farms which have a lot of links emerging from a few IPs. We
finally remove blacklisted hosts. We find the blacklisted hosts through two different
methods. In the first method, we build a DNS graph using hosts, IPs and authorita-
tive DNS nameservers. We perform a controlled BFS on this graph using the average
PSUPP values of an IP address. In the second method, we use the average rank of
hosts using PSUPP on a IP address. We remove these blacklisted hosts from the host
graph and calculate PSUPP on the updated graph. We call this method True PLD
supporters(TSUPP). We found that TSUPP had around 0.3% spam sites on the top
100,000 hosts. We further propose that we can iterate using TSUPP. We can use
the TSUPP values to update blacklists and find more spam hosts. After removing
the hosts from the updated blacklists, we can calculate the TSUPP values for the
next iteration and keep repeating the process. We compare different algorithms using
Google Toolbar Ranks (GTR) and manual analysis of sampled sites.
4CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
A variety of spamming techniques can be used against search-engines [5]. Spam farms
exploit link based ranking algorithms like HITS [6] and PageRank [2]. Spam farms
are used to endorse a target page. They achieve high page scores by interlinking be-
tween their pages [7]. A count of level-2 supporters(SUPP) on the ingraph has been
found to be effective in eliminating the effect of link farms [3].
There have been numerous solutions to find link spam. TrustRank [8] proposes
trust to be propagated through neighbors by starting from a seed set. SpamRank [9]
proposes penalty to a page if the PageRank score distributions of in-degree neighbors
is suspicious. Topical TrustRank [10] gives trust scores for each topic separately to
ensure different topics on the web are covered. CredibleRank [11] first automatically
assigns link credibility for all web pages based on distance from known spam pages.
This is then used while ranking pages. Truncated PageRank [12] reduces the effect of
PageRank of neighbors on a given page. Trust and distrust can be propagated across
the graph through links [13]. There have been studies [14][15] which start with a seed
set of spam pages. Then they propagate the penalty value to other pages through
their links. This penalty value is then considered together with page scores while
ranking pages [14]. Spam is also identified by performing random walks from known
spam seed sets [15]. Spam Mass [16] for a page is calculated from PageRank scores
and by using a set of known good pages.
Spam farms have been found through large strongly connected components in
the webgraph, [17], [18]. Links between pages are re-weighted based on densely con-
nected bipartite components found in the webgraph [19]. Dense subgraphs have been
found to identify communities in the web [20].
5Similarity between URLs, hostnames, content and other properties of a page, [21],
[22], have been used to identify spam. Machine learning classification and discrete
analysis on directed graphs has been used to find link spam [23], [24]. Classification
based on both linking and content has been done to identify spam [25].
All of the above methods try to find link spam using the webgraph. Pages and
links in spam farms are dynamically generated. The idea of giving page scores to
identify spam is ineffective as new pages and hosts can be created. Moreover, iden-
tifying spam from the webgraph is complicated due to its size. We can instead use
finite Pay Level Domains(PLD) and IPv4 addresses to rank hosts. PLD rankings
have been used to allocate crawl budgets [1] [3]. There have been earlier work [4] [26]
[12] [27] that suggest using DNS information. High number of hostnames resolving
to an IP address is indicative of spam [4]. They are known to use wildcard DNS
entries. This enables them to generate infinite number of hostnames with keywords
included in them. Hosting IP addresses have been used as one of the features while
classifying spam [26]. In Truncated PageRank [12], a small set of hosts is manually
inspected for spam. Connected components in DNS queries have been used to find
botnet client-server communication inside a network [27].
6CHAPTER III
DATASET
The dataset used in this paper is from IRLbot [1]. The crawl data contains 7,437,281,300
pages with valid HTTP replies. The hostnames from these pages were then extracted.
There were 641,982,056 hostnames. The distribution of hostnames over different
TLDs is given in Table I. We sampled 615 pages from the crawl randomly and clas-
sified them manually to estimate the amount of spam in the crawl. The results of
the classification are given in Table II. Throughout this paper, we define spam as
pages which contain no meaningful content and excessive use of keywords, links and
possibly machine generated content. There were approximately 15 % spam pages in
the data set. We believe that this makes our dataset better suited to study spam
compared to other crawls like WebBase [28] which have little spam.
A. DNS resolutions
The number of IPv4 addresses is finite. We resolved the list of hostnames from the
crawl of IRLbot. We record all information from DNS while performing resolution
and use it for generating the DNS graph. We implemented a iterative DNS resolver
to collect all DNS information for the list of hostnames we have. We record the
path taken, authoritative servers seen for each hostname and most of the information
returned from a query. We had to implement our own resolver for two reasons (i) to
collect all DNS information related to a hostname (ii) to resolve fast. We did not use
BIND for iterative resolutions due to it’s limitations on the speed at which it resolves.
BIND 9 does recursive resolution synchronously which is blocking [29]. We send
and receive queries asynchronously. There are thousands of unresolved outstanding
queries at any point of time. We then resolved the list of hostnames from IRLbot. We
7Table I. IRLbot TLD distribution.
TLD % hostnames
.com 27.09
.info 26.48
.net 11.37
.org 8.83
others 26.23
Table II. Randomly sampled pages from crawl.
Type % of non HTTP 404 pages
Not spam 82.60
Spam 14.80
Adult 2.60
Table III. Results of DNS resolutions choosing all authoritative servers (5 × XEON
2.4GHz).
Month run Aug. 2010
Duration (hours) 38
Queries per sec (qps) 4,585
Queries sent 641,982,056
Queries resolved 641,982,056
Queries with IPv4 responses 175,482,673
Queries with CNAME records 9,220,725
Unique IPv4 addresses 4,266,486
Unique authoritative servers 788,832
Number of hosts with loops 2,685,973
Number of PLDs in hostnames with IPv4 responses 30,766,107
8Table IV. Distribution of Google Toolbar Ranks of hosts with an IPv4 address.
GTR value Number of hosts
10 65
9 1,578
8 28,515
7 76,003
6 378,719
5 1,201,089
4 3,155,279
3 5,887,305
2 6,572,872
1 5,512,704
0 10,304,095
No GTR 142,258,765
ran the resolver on 5 servers with Intel Xeon processors. Some hostnames have more
than one authoritative server. We ask all the authoritative servers. This provides
us with exhaustive DNS information for a given hostname and we get all the name
servers and possible IPv4 addresses. This information is useful in identifying alliances
in a spam farm as we show later. We receive a large number of non-existent domain
(NXDOMAIN) replies as the hostnames were obtained from the crawl in 2007. We
also mark some hostnames as looping when we visit the same nameserver more than
three times in the process of resolving it. The resolution statistics are summarized
in Table III. We also found the Google Toolbar Rank(GTR)s for the hostnames that
were resolved to an IPv4 address. The distribution of the GTRs is tabulated in Table
IV.
9CHAPTER IV
DNS COHOSTING
A. Sorting by density
It was seen in the past that a high number of hostnames on a single IP address is
indicative of spam [4]. We calculated host densities of the IP addresses in our dataset.
We analyzed the content on these servers by picking 100 hostnames uniform randomly
from them. We manually checked the content at the document root of the hostname
and classified it. We found that all of the servers with host density greater than
2,000,000 were hosting spam when randomly sampled.
After resolving the hostnames from our crawl data, we have web servers {i1, i2,...,
ik} and PLDs {p1, p2, ..., pm}. The set of hosts on IP i is given by NH(i). We calculate
the host density |NH(i)| for web server i. We similarly calculate PLD density |NP (i)|
for web server i. They are then sorted based on the densities. The % spam on each
server is calculated by manually checking 100 randomly picked hostnames from the
top IPs in the sorted list.
We classified the type of content on the top 100 IPs based on host density and
describe them below.
Parking. Parking services were the most commonly found type of server. They
hosted a large number of PLDs.
Keyword spam. These servers hosted only a few PLDs, but had a high host density
by the use of DNS wildcards. Most of the hostnames appear machine generated
with keywords. For example, language-study-programs.gov-diet.motorheads.ru.
This also included adult sites that had lot of keywords included into the host-
name.
10
Content spam. These servers contained pages that looked genuine, but all the host-
names on the server looked identical. Some of them generated synthetic content
by stealing feeds from other sites.
Affiliate marketing. Affiliate marketing sites includes sites like Clickbank, where
each user markets their product using a unique link. The user is given their
own subdomain to market different products.
The top 15 IP addresses based on host density and their classification is listed in
Table V. The different types of servers found in the top 100 IPs based on host density
is listed in Table VI. We found 83 web servers to be hosting 100 % spam based on their
high host density. We also observed that, out of the 175,482,673 hostnames that had
an IPv4 address, 97,841,969 resided on the top 150 IP addresses by host density and
most of them were spam when we sampled. The number of URLs from these spam
servers that were crawled by IRLbot are shown in Table VII. These servers contained
about 5 % of the original crawled pages. We can avoid a significant amount of spam
using host density information.
Although we discovered a lot of spam using host density, there were also false
positives like blogspot.com and livejournal.com, which had a high host density as each
user is given a subdomain. There are also hosting services, which usually host a
lot of sites together on a single server. We can eliminate these false positives using
some form of metric from the webgraph. However, this method will not aid us in
eliminating all spam pages as there would still be spam pages located on low host
density IPs. We next rank IPs using the IP graph which is derived from the host
graph of IRLbot.
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Table VI. Types of servers in top 100 IPs based on host density.
Type % servers % spam
Domain parking 59 100
Keyword spam 16 100
Blogs 11 0
Content spam 8 100
Hosting 4 0
Affiliate marketing 2 100
Table VII. Spam URLs in top 100 IPs based on host density.
Total URLs crawled 6,380,051,942
Spam URLs in the top 100 IPs 318,656,719 ( 5%)
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CHAPTER V
RANKING ALGORITHMS
PLD level crawl budgets have been allocated using PLD rankings from the PLD
graph[3]. We can similarly rank hosts to allocate site level budgets. We compare
different existing ranking algorithms and our proposed algorithms on the host graph of
IRLbot, which has 641,982,061 unique sites out of these 117,576,295 were downloaded
during the crawl. The PLD graph of IRLbot has 89,652,630 nodes, 33,755,361 were
downloaded. We also analyze different algorithms in ranking IPs using the IP graph.
A. Existing algorithms
PageRank [2] is based on random walks on the web graph (V ,E). It is calculated as
the stationary probability of visiting a page j. It follows how a random surfer will
propagate through the outlinks of the current page or teleports to a random page.
IN counts the number of inlinks at each node of the graph and excludes self loops.
SUPP represents the number of unique nodes i with a path with shortest distance
d(i, j) = 2 to j. This is the number of unique neighbors at level-2 of a BFS on the
ingraph. SUPP was used to rank PLDs in the PLD graph and has been found to
avoid spam in the PLD rankings [3]. It was found that d(i, j) = 2 performs optimally
in ranking PLDs.
We assign sequential IDs to nodes similar to methods for efficient computation of
PageRank [30]. The graph is vertically partitioned with each of the partition having
all source nodes, but have only edges with nodes corresponding to that partition. We
create k partitions of the ingraph as explained in Algorithm 1. We keep few of the
partitions in memory based on available RAM. The number of partition required is
G
R
, where G is the graph size and R is the RAM capacity. We then read through the
14
ingraph from disk to find level-2 supporters in the partitions in memory. We finally
merge the counts across different partitions to find the total SUPP value.
SUPP (j) =
k∑
p=1
np∑
i=1
1d(i,j)=2, (5.1)
where np is the number of nodes in partition p.
Input:indegree graph (V,E), V numbered from 0 to |V |, number of partitions k ;
Output:k partitions of graph (V,E);
for i = 1 to k do
for each vertex v ∈ V do
Vi ← v
for each edge (v, u) ∈ E do
if partition(u)=i then
Ei ← (v, u)
end if
end for
end for
end for
Algorithm 1: Partition graph
B. Host graph
We first ranked hosts using the host graph of IRLbot. We ranked them using IN,
PageRank and SUPP. We found that IN and PageRank had a significant amount of
spam in the top 1000 hosts, while SUPP had only one spam host in the top 1000.
However, SUPP has a lot of spam in the top 100,000. The above algorithms failed
because an infinite resource is being ranked using infinite resources. Spammers can
manipulate the algorithms by generating malicious structures in the host graph. The
results of these algorithms are later compared with our proposed method.
15
C. IP graph
We ranked IPs using the IP graph. The IP graph is derived by reducing the host
graph of IRLbot. We thought we could find higher quality hosts on higher ranked
IPs. We ranked IPs using level-1 supporters(IN) and level-2 supporters(SUPP)[3] on
the IP graph. The top 15 IP addresses based on IN and SUPP is shown in Table VIII.
We found that there were few spam IPs ranked higher. On further analysis we found
that one of them was a parking services owned by GoDaddy, a hosting providers.
Hosting IPs had high IN and SUPP on the IP graph due to the IP diversity of the
sites hosted on them. Hence, we found that the IP graph was not very useful to
identify quality hosts.
D. Heterogenous graphs
Spammers could generate an infinite number of hostnames to support their hosts. It
would be harder for them to get a large number of finite resources to support them.
For example, it would be harder to get a large amount of PLDs supporters at level-2
due to the cost involved in buying PLDs. We reduce the host ← host ingraph to
host← PLD graph. We merge this graph with the PLD ingraph as shown in Fig. 1.
We then calculated SUPP on this graph. We create k partitions of the PLD ingraph
and keep few of them in memory. We then read through the host ← PLD graph
from disk to find level-2 supporters in the partitions in memory and merge the counts
across different partitions to find the total PSUPP value.
PSUPP (j) =
k∑
p=1
np∑
i=1
1d(i,j)=2, (5.2)
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Host
PLD
PLD
PLD
PLD
PLD
Fig. 1. Host-PLD-PLD ingraph.
where np is the number of nodes in partition p. The number of disk reads required is
O(k(G + P )) where G is the size of the host ← PLD graph and P is the maximum
size of a partition.
E. Analysis
We first use Google Toolbar Ranks(GTR) to compare rankings similar to the study in
[3]. We compare all the algorithms with a randomly generated ranking from the graph.
We find the GTRs for the top 100,000 hosts in PageRank, SUPP, IN, Random and
PSUPP. The top 10 sites from the algorithms are tabulated in Table IX. PageRank
had a lot of spam pages like information.com at the top of the ranking. IN was
better for the top 10 hosts but had a lot of spam as seen next during manual analysis.
SUPP and PSUPP both also perform well for the top 10 hosts. We plot the average
GTR for all hosts that have a GTR value in Fig. 2(a). The GTR values of hosts
without a GTR or with zero GTR values are not counted towards the average. We see
that PSUPP has the highest overall average GTR. SUPP on the hostgraph performs
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consistently and close to PSUPP, but drops after 10,000 hosts. PageRank and IN
both have an average GTR of around 5 after the first 1000 hosts. Their performance
is inconsistent. The number of hosts which have a GTR=0 is plotted in Fig. 2(b).
PSUPP performs the best here with the first host with zero GTR appears around the
rank of 10,000. The number of hosts for which Google did not have a GTR is plotted
in Fig. 2(c). These included hosts for which Google did not assign a GTR and also
non-existent hosts. We also compare the ranking algorithms for spam by sampling
hosts and manually analyzing them. We sample from each ranking the hosts that
have a GTR < 4 with varying probabilities as explained next. We sample with a
probability 0.5 for the hosts in the first 1000 ranks, 0.33 for hosts ranked from 1000
to 10,000 and 0.01 for the hosts from 10,000 to 100,000. This is plotted in Fig. 3.
Since data from IRLbot is from the crawl in 2007, it is possible that some legitimate
sites that were highly ranked in 2007, are non-existent and parked now. Thus, we
separately count parking sites and the rest of spam pages. We plot the count of
parked sites in Fig. 3(a) and the rest of the spam pages in Fig. 3(b). We notice
that majority of the spam pages are parked sites. PSUPP also doesn’t have spam till
close to rank 10,000. The total projected spam in the different methods is tabulated
in Table X. IN has the highest amount of spam in the top 1000, 10,000 and 100,000
hosts. This is followed by PageRank which has lot of spam between 1000 and 10,000
ranks, improves after 10,000 hosts. This can also be noticed in the average GTR
plot where the GTR slightly improves for PageRank, while it drops for IN. PSUPP
performs the best based in terms of both average GTR and spam found with only
3% spam in the top 100,000 hosts. SUPP has a high GTR and low spam till the top
10,000 hosts. Its GTR drops after 10,000 hosts and spam count increases.
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Table X. Projected % spam in the top hosts.
Algorithm top 1000 top 10,000 top 100,000
IN 30 21 16.5
PageRank 10 19 10.1
SUPP 0 0.6 9.1
PSUPP 0 0.03 2.9
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CHAPTER VI
TRUE SUPPORT(TSUPP)
When we ranked hosts using PSUPP, we found several questionable sites like www.sedo-
-parking.com in the top 10K hosts. It is possible for a spammer to still manipulate
PSUPP. We found that just a few links from a reputed site could boost the rankings
of an obscure site significantly. It is also possible for spammers to create structures
in the web to make their sites rank higher. So, we removed some edges on the host
graph based on certain conditions and ranked the hosts again.
A. Removing stolen support
It is possible for a site to get a large number of supporters if it could generate links
from popular sites, which can be done by adding links from blogs, forums. It is
also possible that a higher ranked site inadvertently places a link to a questionable
site. For example, we found in our dataset that; a link from research.microsoft.com
to searchportal.information.com led to a large number of supporters for searchpor-
tal.information.com which is a parking service. We found that it came from a page
of a research study which concluded that searchportal.informaiton.com was a spam
page and added a link to it. It is important for highly ranked sites to set nofollow
to the rel attribute of links they don’t wish to endorse. We decide to count only the
support from sites that truly mean to boost your ranking and which are ranked lower
than it. Support to a site should also comes homogenously through its neighbors,
a single link should not contribute to a significant share of the total support for a
site. We compute support in this egalitarian environment and consider that this is
the true support a site deserves. Our goal is identify high quality sites which would
be allocated higher budgets. We observed that such sites generally have a high value
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of support even after removing the links. We call this improved method as True
supporters(TSUPP).
To Compute TSUPP, we remove all inlinks in the host ingraph that come from
higher ranked hosts to a lower ranked host. After we remove the links, we re-rank
the hosts and repeat the process again using the new ranks. We stop after the second
iteration since there is not much of a difference in the graph. We then remove outlier
inlinks from hosts which contribute more than ε % of the total PSUPP value to a
host. We used a ε value of 5 %.
B. Removing support from link farms
It is possible that a site be promoted by spammers. A target site could achieve a high
rank if it could get support from a large number of low ranked sites. A reputed site
like google.com could also have a large number of low ranked sites. The difference
for a spammer, however, is that its supporters will usually reside on a fewer IPs.
Spammers own fewer IPs as they involve a significant costs and as evidenced by the
high host density we observed on spam servers. We make use of the host-IP-PLD
graphs to identify hosts supporting a site and residing on the same IP. So, if there
are more than one host inlinks from a given IP to a host, only one randomly chosen
host is retained, inlinks from all other hosts from that IP are dropped.
C. DNS blacklists
Our goal is to efficiently find the top quality sites for budget allocation. This is a
small fraction of the whole collection of sites. Top sites also get support from other
high quality sites, but don’t depend on spam and low quality content for support. We
also found that many spam servers were cohosted with such low quality content. We
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propose two methods to remove the low quality sites and spam from our data set.
In the first method, we develop a new algorithm to cluster spam using DNS
cohosting information and PSUPP. We first compute the average PSUPP value for
each IP over the hostnames that are hosted on that IP.
PSUPP (i) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
PSUPP (hi), (6.1)
where h1, h2,...,hn are hosted on i. We use the average PSUPP(i) while adding new
spam IPs. A webserver that hosts high quality websites will have a higher PSUPP(i).
We create of seed set of IPs, from which we find more IPs using a graph we have
constructed out of the DNS structure. The seed set is defined as below :
IPH = {i, ∀ i ∈ IP : |NH(i)| > a and PSUPP (i) < b, } (6.2)
where a is the threshold host density and b is the threshold average PSUPP value for
an IP address. We set a to 10,000 and b to 10,000 and sampled the hosts on IPH .
We found that 99% of the hosts were spam. When sampled, we noticed that all of
them were low quality sites which were unlikely to be ranked in the top 100,000 hosts.
We have created a graph using DNS information. The vertices of the graph are IP
addresses and authoritative IPs. The edges are between IPs and authoritative IPs.
This graph can help us in finding alliances and co-hosted content. So, we perform a
BFS from IPH and add IPs which satisfy PSUPP (i) < b. We finally remove from
the graph the hosts that are hosted on these IPs.
In our second method to remove low quality content, we define the average rank
of an IP as the average of PSUPP ranks of all the hosts on that IP. We use the DNS
graph as above but choose IPs who have an average PSUPP rank greater than c.
After removing the edges and hosts from the host graph, we generate the new host←
PLD graph and PLD ingraph and calculate PSUPP.
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Table XI. Projected % spam in the top 100,000 hosts.
Algorithm % spam
PSUPP 2.9
TSUPP (a=1000,b=5000) 1
TSUPP (a=100,b=50,000) 0.3
TSUPP (a=100,b=100,000) 0.3
D. Analysis
The average GTR is plotted in Fig. 4(a). We observed that TSUPP significantly
improved the average GTR of PSUPP when using blacklists from the DNS graph.
The total number of parked sites and other spam sites are plotted in Fig. 4(b) and
Fig. 4(c) respectively. It is seen that the amount of spam in the top 100,000 hosts of
TSUPP could be controlled by the parameters chosen for the blacklisted hosts. The
total projected spam in the different methods is tabulated in Table XI.
We find that there is around 0.3% spam in the top 100,000 hosts of TSUPP for
a=100 and b=100,000. We still found a few parked sites in the top 100,000. This is
because the IP addresses of these sites were not in our dataset. Their IP addresses
had changed after our DNS resolutions. Parked sites though will not be a problem
when performing a fresh crawl and elimination of other types of spam is more crucial.
We also compare PSUPP and TSUPP for a=100 and b=100,000 to see how TSUPP
modifies PSUPP. This is plotted in Fig. 5. We observe that there is not much change
in the top 1000 hosts, but few of the spam hosts are moved down the ranking in
TSUPP.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
It is a challenging problem to rank an infinite resource like hostname, since spammers
can manipulate ranking algorithms. In this paper, we have proposed two algorithms
to rank hosts. TSUPP performs efficiently compared to existing ranking algorithms in
identifying the top hosts and eliminating spam. We first tried existing algorithms
PageRank, IN and SUPP and found that they have a significant amount of spam in
the top 100,000 hosts. We propose a novel method to generate heterogenous graphs
with finite resources like PLDs to rank hosts. The basic version of this called PSUPP
performs better than all existing methods in terms of average GTR and the manual
spam count. There is around 3% spam in the top 100,000 hosts. We then propose
another ranking algorithms called TSUPP which applies a variety of rules to remove
hosts and links from the host graph. The links are based on true egalitarian support
and host-IP-PLD graph is used to merge multiple hosts on the same IP. We also apply
DNS blacklists to remove certain low quality IPs from the graph. The improved
version of PSUPP performs significantly better and remove most of the spam in
PSUPP, with only 0.3% spam in the top 100,000 hosts.
We have also proposed a method to efficiently parallelize computation of SUPP
on large graphs by creating partitions. We implemented it and could be used to
compute SUPP values in real-time. By considering only the top 100,000 hosts which
have negligible spam in TSUPP, we could save a lot of overhead in future crawls.
The algorithms proposed for the host graph can be extended to the PLD graph
and be compared to existing algorithms for ranking PLDs. We found that SUPP
performed poorly for hosts and IPs. It ranked spam IPs and hosts in the top of the
ranking. However, SUPP on the PLD graph was found to have worked well. We can
30
compare the position of hosts in its ranking of PLD, IP and hosts to find anomalies.
If there is an inconsistency, a host could be marked as suspicious.
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